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In order to understand the Hegelian project, its 
"immanent" development and its appropriation of philo-
sophical systems before it, it is necessary for us to 
carry out a constant process of comparing and contrast-
ing what Hegel attempts with what other philosophers 
had attempted. As one works through the second major 
division of Hegel's Logic, the shadow of the Kantian 
system is ever present. Most obviously this is the 
case as Hegel considers and rearranges the various cat-
egories which had been crucial for Kant. However, 
since Hegel will not only manipulate for his own pur-
poses and follow out the development of such categor-
ies, but will also go beyond them, a reconsideration of 
his claims will profit from a comparison with the 
Kantian system. Thus, I intend to review what seem 
crucial aspects, implicit or explicit, of Kant's first 
Critique as they apply to the materials with which 
Hegel ends his consideration of "Essence," especially 
in order to see what happens to Kantian reciprocity at 
the hands of Hegel. 
I 
We must first recall a few salient points of the 
Kantian system. Through the discovery of the transcen-
dental unity of apperception, Kant explores as fully as 
he thinks possible the regressive epistemic movement. 
He claims this movement to be self-limiting and in-
herently capable of avoiding the metaphysical trap of 
an infinite regression which could only yield scepti-
cism about any knowing whatsoever. This limit encoun-
tered is the transparency or non-solidity of the tran-
scendental unity of apperception. It defines what is 
within our grasp. Kant is not tempted by the need or 
necessity of going beyond that limit if we are unable. 
He avoids the old metaphysical trap of ontological 
principles and concepts. 
Through the Critique we have learned of reason's 
temptation or propensity toward transcendent transgres-
sion. Already, we may anticipate that what Kant con-
strues as a limit to knowing and therefore as a more 
solid, well-clarified, because delimited, aspect of the 
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known, Hegel will seize upon as the mere, impotent lim-
itation upon our knowing, assuming us to be capable of 
much more. In the ultimate sense, any Kantian "find" 
will remain for Hegel a usual proposition, a partial 
truth or aspect of the true speculative proposition. 
Usual propositions deal with limits which are simply 
truncated partializations; they assume foundations, as 
well, which themselves need grounding, establishing the 
movement of a bad infinite. Only the true movement of 
the speculative proposition provides any escape from 
such a guandry. We must keep this in mind, throughout; 
it will be especially crucial to Hegel's move "beyond" 
reciprocity. 
Yet, for Kant knowing is limited through and relat-
ed to experience. Forms of knowing may not need exper-
ience in any sense of being determined by experience 
but will always bear relation to and with experience. 
Knowing and experiencing are always situated together. 
Kant consistently emphasizes this point: 
We can, however, with regard to these concepts, 
as with regard to all knowledge, seek to discover 
in experience, if not the principle of their pos-
sibility, at least the occasioning causes of 
their production. 1 
Kant's stress upon Gelegenheitsursachen, translated 
somewhat overdeterminately as ''occasioning causes," 
would point to experience as the "favorable, nurturing 
moment and ground" of and for the production of con-
cepts in particular, and of knowledge in general. This 
is to stress the sense in which Kant sees knowledge and 
experience, each delimited in certain respects, none-
theless crucially growing up together. If there is to 
be metaphysical knowledge not arising from experience, 
it will be nonetheless restricted to and with it. 1 How 
might we understand this in relation to the Hegelian 
system? 
Hyppolite has attempted to elucidate aspects of the 
Hegelian system by speaking of the relationship of na-
ture to logos. He takes spirit for Hegel to be the mu-
tual reflecting, intershadowing, reciprocity of these 
two. They are related in the special sense that: 
One should not say Word and Nature, but rather 
Word is Nature, Nature is Word. Judgment (Ur-
teil) brings to the surface the originary divi-
sion, it is relative identity, mediation still 
unmediated. It is only reason, as mediation, 
which develops the dialectical character of this 
is, by showing at the same time, the opposition 
of terms, their contradiction, and their iden-
tity. Reason alone makes spirit appear within 
Word and Nature.' 
153 
As Hyppolite notes, with Hegel one does not properly 
"say" nature and logos. Rather, "nature is logos" is 
to be said. Such an "and" for Hegel would remain a 
connection of mere externality; thus, one only properly 
speaks of the "is," the level of identity which relates 
them. Yet, for Kant, we see that such an "and" of mere 
external relation is insufficient as well. But against 
Hegel, the Kantian claim is that the "is" linking na-
ture and logos (word) is too strong. This is to say 
that for Kant, nature and logos, experience and concept 
are together to the degree that they always grow up to-
gether. Yet, as different levels of interrelated giv-
enness, they cannot be completely identified. They 
maintain at the heart of their internal relatedness a 
certain reciprocal resistance toward each other. Logos 
is not completely, merely, nature. Mature is not fully 
sayable (logos). Interrogating the relationship of 
concepts to experience, in experience, may not yield 
the principle of their possibility. Yet, it can give 
us a perspective on the generation or production of 
such concepts in relation to experience. 
Although it may be argued that in the first Cri-
tique Kant merely pursues such a perspective, thus more 
explicitly dealing with the "logos" side alone, the 
sayability of nature, it is clear that the very pursuit 
of such a perspective depends on the status of a sub-
jectivity which is the tension of logos-nature. Most 
clearly seen in the practical philosophy, but ever pre-
sent in the theoretical as well, is this tension point 
which is the spontaneous, generative transcendental 
unity of apperception, which is participant-speaker in 
and with logos, which is observer and element in and 
with nature. The Kantian doctrine concerns the is and 
the and of the relationship nature/logos, their inter-
nal relation and mutual self-limiting and resistance. 
Such a doctrine claims only to discover levels of rela-
tionship, resistance, and givenness. It does not nec-
essarily seek, much less presume discoverable, an ulti-
mate, solid ground out of which all levels may be der-
ived. 
The Kantian system in general argues that if any 
"ultimate principles" are to be discovered, as Ontology 
had assumed to be possible, such discovery will be only 
an outcome of the critical establishing and limiting of 
knowing, in and by experience. Following Hyppolite, 
nature and logos are viewed as self-establishing, cor-
recting, and limiting. Given this framework, one might 
then view Kant's first Critique as an exploration of 
the nature-logos relationship with particular attention 
paid to the original cognitive situation. And here, we 
will find crucial the doctrines concerning limit and 
reciprocity, or negation and internal relation. 
The first extensive treatment of these doctrines is 
found at the level of "relation" and the disjunctive 
judgment. It has community as its ever-present parallel 
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in the table of categories. Kant has outlined all 
areas of relation as subsumed under those of predicate 
to subject, ground to consequence, and divided knowl-
edge and the members of such division to each other. 
Whereas the first two types of relation seem to empha-
size the re-union of externals, predicate to subject, 
ground to consequence, the third area emphasizes the 
inter-relatedness of disjuncts to each other in a hol-
istic community. That is to say, the components of the 
either-or "occupfyj a part of the sphere of the possi-
ble knowledge concerning the existence of a world in 
general; all of them together occupy the whole 
sphere."* Inasmuch as the introduction of negation at 
the level of judgments of quality served to delineate 
the extension or exclusion of certain spheres of cogni-
tion given the worth or content of affirmation even 
through "a merely negative predicate," the disjunctive 
judgment seems to rely upon such exclusion but in order 
to seek out the community implied by the disjuncts: 
There is, therefore, in a disjunctive judgment a 
certain community of the known constituents, such 
that they mutually exclude each other, and yet 
thereby determine in their totality the true 
knowledge. 8 
Kant does not elaborate at this point the way in 
which the possible scope of disjuncts may "constitute 
the whole content of one given knowledge." Yet, in ex-
amining the level of judgments of modality one sees 
that the level of relation is, of a fashion, the apex 
of the table of judgments. 8 For, in speaking of modal-
ity, Kant notes that its striking characteristic is 
that it "contributes nothing to the content of the 
judgment." He claims there to be nothing constitutive 
of content beyond quantity, quality, and relation. 
Here negation, as well as affirmation, is taken as pos-
sible, at the level of problematic judgment; in asser-
toric judgment it is taken as real; in apodeictic judg-
ment it is taken as necessary. The fundamental status 
or role of negation, however, is not changed beyond its 
having been established at the levels of quality and 
relation. 
Initially, one might have asked why negation-
limitation appears in the second division of the table, 
is mentioned also in the fourth, but seems lacking in 
the third. It would appear that negative judgment is 
crucial at the level of quality and makes possible a 
de-limitation of the sphere of complete, unrestricted 
affirmation with its tendency toward infinite judgment. 
Negation functions as that setting-off of boundaries of 
judgment, making it possible to distinguish between 
various predicates. At the level of relation, Kant 
continues to rely implicitly on negation in the dis-
junctive judgment, again as de-limitation, but now with 
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more primary emphasis upon the ability of the disjunc-
tive judgment to outline or delimit a possible sphere 
by the totalizing of heretofore separated spheres re-
presented by the disjuncts. Negation and its contribu-
tion are merely less "visible" in that the emphasis is 
to be placed on the possible community of disjuncts, 
which when totalized may yield a community of the know-
able. 
Kant explains the movement from the table of judg-
ments to the table of categories in a discussion of the 
difference between general logic's procedure of analy-
sis, bringing different representations under one con-
cept and transcendental logic's bringing to concepts, 
not representations, but pure synthesis of representa-
tions. Three levels of givenness are outlined as nec-
essary: the manifold of pure intuition, synthesis of 
this manifold by imagination, and the concepts giving 
unity to this pure synthesis. Only these three togeth-
er can yield knowledge. The linkage between judgments 
and categories is one of sameness of function. 
The same understanding, through the same opera-
tions by which in concepts, by means of analyti-
cal unity, it produced the logical form of a 
judgment, also introduces a transcendental con-
tent into its representations, by means of the 
synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in 
general. 7 
Such representations, the pure concepts of the un-
derstanding, are seen as applying a priori to objects 
and found at this level, heretofore unable to be dis-
covered by general logic. Kant "finds" the same number 
and grouping of pure concepts of the understanding ap-
plied a priori to objects of intuition in general as ' 
had been discovered logical functions for all possible 
judgments. Thus appear in similar fashion: negation 
at the level of quality, community at the level of re-
lation, with particular emphasis upon reciprocity of 
de-limited spheres (agent-patient), existence/nonexis-
tence at the level of modality (these all being most 
crucial to our enquiry). 
Although Kant, in following out reason's critique 
in pursuit of a doctrine of method, does not see fit to 
provide exhaustive definitions of the categories, he 
does provide explication of crucial points concerning 
the table. Thus, he notes the organization of the 
levels of the table into groupings of three, emphasiz-
ing that each third category arises by combining each 
second one with the first. Hence, one may note the 
crucial role, contributed by negation in the broadest 
sense, of the second category of each division, pro-
viding a schism, de-limiting, or separation of the ple-
num of each first term. Each second category would ap-
pear to follow the general pattern of negation's role 
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under "quality," putting differentiation at the heart 
of the first terms. This delimiting of a given sphere 
thus allows a possible knowledge and totalizing as man-
ifest by each third term. This is most explicitly seen 
when taken up as "community" or "reciprocity" under 
"relation. 1 1 Kant stresses the sense in which the third 
category of each level is as primary as, never deriva-
tive of, the other two: 
For the combination of the first and second con-
cepts, in order that the third may be produced, 
requires a special act of the understanding, 
which is not identical with that which is exer-
cised in the case of the first and the second.* 
Here he pays attention to the co-ordination, not mere 
sub-ordination operative in the disjunctive judgment. 
Such co-ordination has been seen linked to the role of 
negation as establishing de-limited spheres such that 
the disjuncts ai-e established in community with each 
other in their being-apart. Any idea of community-
reciprocity for Kant thus upholds a particular sense of 
negation as de-limiting and specifies that the peculiar 
character of community-reciprocity is its being rela-
tion as internal relation. 
Kant Ts stress upon community and the doctrine of 
internal relations is to be found throughout the first 
Critique at various levels. However, his discussion 
concerning the third analogy of experience yields im-
portant insight into these doctrines. The third anal-
ogy pursues Kant's general attack on mere externality 
of relations and the affirmation of the critical role 
of community. The B edition version of the formulation 
of the analogy reflects a refinement or de-limiting of 
the scope of the claim of the analogy in the A edition. 
While earlier holding that "All substances, so far as 
they coexist, stand in thoroughgoing community, that 
is, in mutual interaction." Kant now moves from a more 
grandiose, ontologically tempting claim to the more 
modest, epistemological claim: "All substances, in so 
far as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are 
in thoroughgoing reciprocity."' The doctrines of com-
munity and internal relations are present in both ver-
sions, showing Kant's ongoing concern for these views. 
Yet, it is crucial that the B version evidences Kant's 
pulling back from the earlier temptation to claim on-
tological status for community. The change in the two 
versions reflects Kant's temptation by the ontological 
transgression whereby one says "Nature is logos." The 
B version form of the third analogy affirms the growing 
up together, but mutual conflict and interaction, of 
nature and logos. 
Kant's revised version of reciprocity, then, empha-
sizes its being a pure concept of the understanding, 
yielding possible synthetic a priori judgments. The 
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critical role of reciprocity-community, however, is 
most clearly seen to be its capacity to provide us with 
a knowable world in a temporal context. In the discus-
sion of the third analogy Kant notes that through em-
pirical intuition, coexistence of things is possible 
given that the perceptions of them can follow recipro-
cally. The most basic element is that " . . . coexis-
tence is the existence of the manifold in one and the 
same time." 1 0 A problem arises, however, in the impos-
sibility of the perception of time itself and this is 
compounded by the apparent relation of things in the 
world as being merely externally related: 
The synthesis of imagination in apprehension 
would only reveal that the one perception is in 
the subject when the other is not there, and vice 
versa, but not that the objects are coexistent, 
that is, that if the one exists the other exists 
at the same time, and that it is only because 
they thus coexist that the perceptions are able 
to follow one another reciprocally. 1 1 
No empirical path alone could lead to anything but the 
perception, the discrete perception, of isolated ob-
jects. 
Coexistence of substances in space is knowable only 
given the assumption of their reciprocal interaction. 
This is the condition of the possibility of the things 
themselves as objects of experience. 1 1 Without such 
levels of coexistence and community, mere exclusionary 
relations would hold; no coherence spatially or tem-
porally would be possible. One would be unable to ac-
count for the experience of the manifold, the ex-
perience of objects as in ongoing relation and coexis-
tence, and the relationship of a possible world of 
knowable objects and relations in their temporal con-
text. One would be left with mere relations of exter-
nality, at all levels of experience—hence, without any 
true experience at all. 
Having delineated the particularization of his gen-
eral doctrines of community and internal relations in 
the discussion of reciprocity as a pure concept of the 
understanding, Kant ends the discussion of the third 
analogy with a note on the word "community" itself. He 
stresses that community has the dual significance of 
meaning communio or commerclum. 1 3 He calls to our at-
tention his use of community in the latter sense, 
stressing again the notion of relationships which are 
active and dynamic. 
Community as local community could not even be pos-
sible without its grounding in community as com-
mercium—i.e., community as the dynamic introplay of 
internal relations. Furthermore, community as communio 
spatii would never be possible without its grounding in 
the more primary community as commercium which is in-
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tro-related with the generation of temporality via the 
perceiving subject. Kant has here returned to a re-
vised version of the ontological claim merely asserted 
regarding the coexistence of objects in the world. The 
critical perspective, evidenced in the change from the 
A to the B editions of the Critique, now maintains a 
coexistence of possible objects of experience but via 
the dialectical introplay of time-space-perceiver-
objects of experience, in an ongoing community of 
relations. The transcendental unity of apperception is 
now cast as relating us to a community of objects 
perceived-related not by merely exclusionary, isolated, 
truncated perceptions, but by the differentiating-
communality of their commercium with an imaginative 
synthesis which generates with them the temporal con-
text. Such an emergence of a dialectical relation of 
knower-known via their commercium through the genera-
tion of time and the organization of space leads to 
Kant's discovery of the dialectical introplay of 
subject-object, the creation of a world: 
In our mind, all appearances, since they are con-
tained in a possible experience, must stand in 
community (communio) of apperception, and in so 
far as the objects are to be represented as coex-
isting in connection with each other, they must 
mutually determine their position in one time, 
and thereby constitute a whole. If this subjec-
tive community is to rest on an objective ground, 
or is to hold of appearances as substances, the 
perception of the one must as ground make possi-
ble the perception of the other, and reverse-
wise—in order that the succession which is al-
ways found in the perceptions, as apprehensions, 
may not be ascribed to the objects, and in order 
that, on the contrary, these objects may be re-
presented as coexisting. But this is a recipro-
cal influence, that is, a real community, (com-
mercium) of substances; without it the empirical 
relation of coexistence could not be met with in 
experience.** 
The import of the doctrine of community as com-
mercio, community as differentiating and unifying, ul-
timately yielding the dialectical character of the 
originary "word is nature" community, is borne out 
throughout the first Critique. However, Kant clarifies 
in the section on the Concepts of Reflection just how 
the introplay of community (communio) of apperception 
conjoined with real community (commercium) of sub-
stances yields up a holistic commercium of word and na-
ture, concept and reality: 
. . . the principle that realities (as pure as-
sertions) never logically conflict with each oth-
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er is an entirely true proposition as regards the 
relation of concepts, but has not the least mean-
ing in regard either to nature or to anything in 
itself. l s 
Kant would seem to be claiming that the level of nega-
tion for mere concepts, abstracted from but not in re-
lation to experience—the level of general logic--can 
be such that negation in such a realm remains bound to 
a doctrine of external relation. Contrary to this 
level, the levels of nature or experience demonstrate 
dynamic and conflictual community, de-limitation, and 
exclusion such that relation is internal and realities 
conflict, sometimes even annulling each other. Inas-
much as Kantian critique is to show the limits of pos-
sible experience in relation to reason, it is evident 
that it must concern itself with what is beyond the 
level of the mere relation of concepts. So, contrary 
to a doctrine which would affirm "all evils . . .fas} 
merely consequences of the limitations of created be-
ings, that is, negations, since negations alone con-
flict with reality," 1' Kant proposes negation as more 
than merely privation or external, exclusive, exterior 
negation, and hence as the working of exclusion typi-
fied by delimitation of positive spheres—not the nega-
tion which portends the lack, the privation of an ex-
ternal nothingness. These remarks follow the thrust of 
the distribution and movement of the categorial and 
judgmental tables whereby internal relation, movement, 
and interdependency are preserved between the three 
terms of each level. A richer model, that of internal 
relation and conflict, is upheld rather than that of 
negation as privation. 
This striking emphasis paid against "evils . . . 
[as] merely consequences of the limitations of created 
beings," that is against merely external "negations" in 
the section on Concepts of Reflection, is further 
clarified at the end of that section. Here Kant intro-
duces, for the sake of completeness, along with the 
idea of inter-relation and in addition to the concept 
of an object in general, the concept of nothing. In-
terestingly, rather than provide the division of some-
thing, he introduces that of nothing, claiming that the 
former follows directly from it. Here we see most ex-
plicitly the sense in which negation is always rela-
tional, non-external, and is never an object. 1 7 Thus, 
as his allusion to a Leibnizian-Wolffian system makes 
evident, Kant rejects negation as privation, negation 
as an object, in the same way as he elsewhere rejects 
the ultimate intelligibility of a completed, totalized 
whole which would necessarily exceed our access to 
knowledge via experience. If negation is vitally 
linked to internal relation for Kant, it is because all 
knowledge and experience bear to each other reciprocal-
delimiting, the commercio of conflictual relations. 
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One succinct phrase, with which Kant concludes this 
section, seems to encapsulate the thrust of the Kantian 
work: 
Negation and the mere form of intuition, in the 
absence of a something real, are not objects. 1' 
In opposing the claims of any Leibnizian-like model 
for plenitude which is totalized and accessible as a 
discrete whole to knowledge (and in a sense opposing in 
anticipation an Hegelian identity of nature-logos), 
Kant also opposes any similar claim for discrete, ex-
ternal negation. The concept of nothing in general 
must be viewed in its conflictual relation to the con-
cept of something in general, always in relation to 
possible experience. Both concepts seem to be the out-
er, regulative edges of that which is central: commu-
nity and reciprocity as the complexus of internal rela-
tions which conflictually limit and establish each oth-
er, an area accessible to human reason and experience. 
Thus at the heart of all critique of and by pure 
reason, at the center of Kant's entire enterprise, are 
the doctrines of negation internal to all experience, 
delimitation as relational, disjunction and commercio 
of community-reciprocity as a nexus of conflictual re-
lations rather than separable and exclusive. 
II 
Our initial remarks about the Kantian system must 
now be kept in mind as we approach the place of reci-
procity within the doctrine of essence in Hegel's Log-
ic. We have shown how crucial the doctrines of nega-
tion, internal relation, and community-reciprocity seem 
to be for Kant. We have claimed that reciprocity es-
pecially as the "peak" of the third division ("rela-
tion") of the table of categories is something like the 
apex of the table, the heart of the Kantian system. We 
have noted that perhaps Hegel has, in somewhat Kantian 
spirit, seen the richness of the category of recipro-
city, making it the apex of the doctrine of essence. 
Yet, as the Logic of 1830 notes, we must be cautious 
and reassess the Hegelian reappropriation of "reci-
procity" : 
Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proximate truth of 
the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so 
to say, on the threshold of the notion; but on 
that very ground, supposing that our aim is a 
thoroughly comprehensive idea, we should not rest 
content with applying this relation. If we get 
no further than studying a given content under 
the point of view of reciprocity, we are taking 
up an attitude which leaves matters utterly 
incomprehensible. We are left with a mere dry 
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fact; and the call for mediation, which is the 
chief motive in applying the relation of causal-
ity, is still unanswered." 
These remarks lead us to see that Hegel's appropri-
ation of reciprocity has a place in the system but only 
as a transition into the development of the notion. 
Reciprocity remains merely a point of view, a partial-
ized access, a way of studying a given content. Hegel 
capitalizes on the restricted sense or context of reci-
procity as the mere fact of community of agent-patient, 
outgrowths of the mere "facts" of cause and effect. As 
such, his observations on and use of reciprocity seem 
to ignore its more radical functioning as contributing 
to the type of doctrines we have alluded to earlier— 
those of the complexus of reciprocal internal relations 
having a vital sense of negation and limit at their 
center. Such doctrines attempt, by being present and 
crucial for the table of judgments and categories, to 
achieve articulate unification as the self-limiting 
difference of nature-logos. 
Hegel has certainly not read Kant this way and 
takes reciprocity, at best, as a partialization which 
leads into the notion, which "alone" can achieve the 
level of the true. It is not at all surprising that 
Hegel's treatment of reciprocity would seize upon its 
seemingly limited or weaker usage in Kant—that per-
taining to cause and effect and the community of agent-
patient—hence, ignoring the broader, stronger roles we 
have suggested for it above. Taking reciprocity in its 
limited, weaker sense, Hegel may then easily see it as 
a mere external relation of two "sides" resting "in 
their state of mere given facts," 1' evoking a call for 
mediation; as factors, the "sides" evidence the need 
for a "third and higher" factor, "which is the notion 
and nothing else." 1 1 Such a treatment of reciprocity 
should not surprise us, if we recall its placement at 
the "apex" of, but nonetheless within, the doctrine of 
essence. We recall with Hegel: 
The terms in Essence are always mere pairs of 
correlatives, and not yet absolutely reflected in 
themselves: hence in essence the actual unity of 
the notion is not realized, but only postulated 
by reflection. 1 8 
Reciprocity and all other terms in the doctrine of 
essence, can have no vital sense central to the rela-
tionship of nature-logos. That is to say that it can-
not take on the status of a primary doctrine of inter-
nal relation for Hegel as we had suggested it assumes 
for Kant. This is the case in that nowhere in "es-
sence" is the actual unity of the notion realized; it 
is only postulated by reflection. We must explore fur-
ther the way in which Hegel "finds" reciprocity situ-
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ated in essence so as to understand his treatment of 
it, thus constituting his radical divergence from Kant. 
Because reciprocity is found, for Hegel, within the 
doctrine of essence, we must recall what Hegel's claim 
means—that the truth of Being is essence. The initial 
remarks of the second book have reiterated the sense in 
which Being is the immediate. As such, and because 
knowing will not stop short of becoming knowledge of 
what Being is in and for itself, knowledge penetrates 
Being. Hegel indicates here that movement beyond the 
immediacy of Being is one of inwardization, of recol-
lection. Knowing recollects itself out of immediate 
being; through such mediation essence and all its cate-
gories, including reciprocity, are found.* 1 Here Hegel 
capitalizes upon his natural language's use of the past 
participle of "to be" to express essence. Essence (as 
gewesen) is past--as timelessly past--being. His use 
of the past participle in this way would seem to at-
tribute to essence a certain persistence, the state of 
its being-non-temporally. If originally, then, the ab-
solute was taken as Being, such a stance of immediacy 
was a-temporal but without the character of any effec-
tiveness for cognition as that which can be appro-
priated. The movement of cognition, however, encoun-
ters essence as equally a-temporal, but now as a state 
of the persistence of Being as recollected and inward-
ized. 
Hegel notes that cognition "cannot stop short at 
manifold determinate being, nor yet at being, pure be-
ing." 2* Reflection, he says, forces itself on the 
scene, showing that pure being, as the negation of all 
that is finite, presupposes internalization, recollec-
tion, and movement which have purified and transformed 
immediate determinate being into pure being. We thus 
see Being determined as essence, where everything de-
terminate and finite is negated. We must note already, 
even in such a general context as this, that recipro-
city will be situated at the peak of a grouping of cat-
egories which involve and express utter negation of all 
that is determinate and finite. That this implies a 
radical divergence from Kant's use of reciprocity must 
be clarified further. Already in these opening pas-
sages which introduce us to the doctrine of essence, we 
begin to see some major aspects of this divergence: 
We have already mentioned that if essence is de-
fined as the sum total of all realities, then 
these realities likewise are subordinate to the 
nature of the determinateness and to the abstrac-
tive reflection and this sum total reduces to 
empty oneness. 2 5 
In the last analysis, the more comprehensive and 
comprehensible status of essence will be its emptiness 
as well. For it remains prisoner of the levels of 
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givenness upon which it relies, out of which its in-
wardization has achieved a higher but, as yet, still 
inadequate level of knowledge; it remains dependent 
upon the "nature" of determinateness and upon abstrac-
tive reflection- At the level of essence, for Hegel, 
these are conjoined, but externally and without inter-
nal articulation. Summarizing what will be developed 
at greater length as the crucial difference between the 
doctrines of essence and notion, Hegel points to that 
which seems most crucial for our enquiry concerning re-
ciprocity. 
. . . the Notion is the absolute that in its de-
terminate being is absolute, or is in and for it-
self. But the determinate being which essence 
gives itself is not yet determinate being as in 
and for itself, but as given by essence to it-
self, or as posited, and is consequently still 
distinct from the determinate being of the No-
tion." 
To the degree that reciprocity falls within the 
domain of the doctrine of essence it can never, of it-
self alone, achieve the status it held for Kant. It 
remains at best, as Hegel puts it, at the level of pro-
duct or artifact. 2 7 This is the case in that the cate-
gories of essence are only levels of givenness by es-
sence to itself and not those of determinateness as in 
and for themselves. What might then be taken as the 
dynamism of the Kantian doctrines of reciprocity, a dy-
namism combining the movement of limitation-negation 
with internal relatedness, remains for Hegel as the 
static formalism which attempts to cement the categor-
ial format to the manifold of sense. Both are given 
for Kant, only to be united in a knowing subject. For 
Hegel such levels of mere givenness, only coherent unto 
themselves, remain external. Again, as we have earlier 
noted, for Hegel only the movement of the Notion, be-
yond essence, can overcome the alleged externality of 
such levels of givenness which he takes Kant to have 
accepted "blindly." Essence, and reciprocity within 
it, at best remains only a level of positedness, of 
givenness, for cognition. 
The third section of the division on the doctrine 
of essence, entitled "Actuality," bears out these gen-
eral remarks, but directing our attention, while fol-
lowing the categorial expositions, to a more specific 
sense of reciprocity's place within the doctrine of 
essence. For Hegel, the movement toward the Notion 
must pass through and beyond exposition to self-
exposition. Such a move into the level of the true 
notional movement occurs, passing through actuality. 
Actuality is the unification of essence and existence, 
the place where formless essence and unstable appear-
ance achieve their truth. The movement is that of 
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reflection-into-an-other into reflection-into-self, be-
coming two worlds, two totalities of content. Essen-
tial relation, however, shows the "form relation" of 
the two, culminating in the relation of inner and outer 
such that the two "contents" of the two worlds are seen 
to be identical. The determinations of form, here, are 
then posited as one absolute totality. 2* 
The first two-thirds of the doctrine of essence, 
then, have built up to the relation of inner and outer, 
culminating in their unity as absolute actuality. 
Again, however, the problem recurs that such actuality, 
as the absolute as such, is a posited unity to which 
reflection bears external relation. Reflection merely 
contemplates the absolute here rather than being the 
absolute's own movement. Hegel notes that the "simple 
substantial identity" of the absolute, the unification 
of essence and existence, here leads into a dissolu-
tion. "Accordingly, the process of determining what 
the absolute is has a negative outcome, and the ab-
solute itself appears only as the negation of all pre-
dicates and as the void." 2' Yet such negation as the 
"position" of all predicates generates, as well, a for-
mal contradiction. Hegel is quick to note that such a 
negating-positing has to do with external reflection 
and a formal and unsystematic dialectic. For such a 
dialectic, casually emphasizing certain determinations 
and not others, seemingly arbitrarily, it is possible 
only to take determinations in their isolated finitude 
and mere relativity to each other, yet as welj. thinking 
vaguely of the absolute as the totality of determina-
tions. Such determinations are somehow immanent in the 
totality, yet the positions-negations of the determina-
tions cannot be raised to a level of genuine unity. 
It is thus seen necessary to demonstrate the ab-
solute, but neither as a determining nor external re-
flection. It is necessary not only to achieve exposi-
tion but also to follow the self-exposition of the ab-
solute and what it is. Even at this point, one might 
interpolate the Hegelian criticisms of Kant and his use 
of or development of the categorial format. Even what 
might be the Kantian claim for the internal coherence 
and relatedness of the categorial arrangement, Hegel 
criticizes as, at best, a formal and ultimately contra-
dictory arrangement of the negation and positioning of 
predicates. Hegel sees such a system as emphasizing a 
merely finite, relative range of predicates with only a 
vague sense for the absolute as the totality of deter-
minations within it. It proposes no true sense of 
unity and cannot achieve an exposition, much less the 
self-exposition, of the absolute. 
If Hegel then were addressing these remarks to the 
specific status of the categorial arrangement offer€;d 
by Kant, his criticism would seem twofold: First, that 
Kant has not adequately developed at the level of each 
of the four major divisions of the categories (or of 
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the judgments) a vital movement among each of the three 
terms. He has only achieved the type of position-
negation which eventuates in formal contradiction, not 
the special status of each third term which Kant 
claims. Secondly, from these remarks throughout "es-
sence," Hegel would seem to imply that anything like 
the Kantian categorial structure is not a true exposi-
tion of the absolute, because unable to show its move-
ment from one level of category to another. Moreover, 
because it cannot even achieve a dynamic movement or 
articulation of relation between levels of categories 
as exposition or movement, it certainly does not ap-
proximate the status of any self-exposition. For 
Hegel, Kant has moved beyond the externality of rela-
tions of the categories of merely formal, traditional 
logic; yet, his achievement of the categories of a 
transcendental logic only complicates the traditional 
logic's formalism by adding another level of emptiness. 
The determinations available through the categories, as 
negation and positing, eventuate in formal contradic-
tion; the inability of the table of categories to be-
come a self-exposition of absolute relationship re-
flects its basis in formal and unsystematic dialectic. 
Only the vague indication of the absolute takes the 
place of a true self-exposition which the necessary de-
velopment and movement of the absolute demands. 
Of course the inability of the Kantian system to 
achieve such a self-exposition derives from its refusal 
of the very standpoint to and from which the Hegelian 
system, and the development of the doctrine of essence 
moves—the absolute and the doctrine of the Notion. To 
the degree that our remarks or projected criticism by 
Hegel against the Kantian categorial system might be 
appropriate, we should be able to find more specific 
corroboration in Hegel's treatment of reciprocity, 
since it will serve as a bridge over into the doctrine 
of the Notion. 
Hegel's rearrangement and reappropriation of the 
fourth division of Kant's categories led him to develop 
necessity into absolute necessity—"being, simply and 
solely as reflection."" This is the relation, a dis-
tinguishing whose elements subsist as its whole total-
ity; there is only one subsistence and any difference 
is only the reflective movement of the process of expo-
sition. Essence is exposed as illusory showing. But 
the achievement of illusory being posited as illusory 
being leaves no residue, rather it is absolute actual-
ity. The absolute, although originally taken up 
through external reflection, now achieves self-posit-
ing. 
Such self-positing shows forth the self-determining 
of the aspects of the absolute relation, beyond the 
level of such aspects merely as attributes. Such a re-
lation, as to its immediate notion, is that of sub-
stance and accidents. Yet, this is only the movement 
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of "absolute illusory being" in itself. Determination 
of substance achieving "being-for-self over against an 
other" has been shown as the absolute relation deter-
mining itself as real. 1 1 This is the relation of caus-
ality. When such a self-relating achieves a unity with 
its determinations, positing the absolute relation in 
accordance with them, reciprocity is attained. Such a 
posited unity, of self-relating and determinations as 
the whole, alone allows the achieving of the notion. 
This, the culminating achievement of the doctrine 
of essence is reciprocity, and the bridge over into the 
Notion. Here Hegel recalls that in finite causality 
substances are actively related to each other. Mechan-
ism is this externality of causality such that the ef-
fectiveness of causality as its reflection into itself 
is, as well, its resistance: 
. . . in the self-identity which the causal sub-
stance has in its effect, the cause equally re-
mains something immediately external to it, and 
the effect has passed over into another sub-
stance. 1 J 
The achievement of reciprocity is the sublation of this 
mechanistic movement, the surpassing of its mere exter-
nality. For reciprocity is the "vanishing" of that 
persistence, here as immediate substantiality, with 
which we recall Hegel first "undertook" essence. Be-
ing, as essence, has traversed the range of its "state" 
as timelessly past being (gewesen). As having under-
gone its own self-exposition as something of a turn in-
to but now recoiling from its formal emptiness, it has 
achieved the level of the "coming-to-be of the cause 
and hence originativeness as self-mediating through its 
negation. t , T 3 Here we must note that this sense of 
originativess as reciprocity is crucial to Kantian doc-
trine in a special way which precludes the (Hegelian) 
necessity of any move to a more absolute standpoint. 
Reciprocity in this sense remains the apex of Kant's 
system. 
But here, quite differently than Kant, Hegel pur-
sues reciprocity as causality of presupposed, self-
conditioning substances which, since each is both ac-
tive and passive in relation to each other, obliterate 
any real distinction between them; this leaves any so-
called reciprocity between them to be an empty formula-
tion. What is required, says Hegel, is an "external 
bringing together of what is already both in itself and 
posited.'* Yet, since no longer substrates but rather 
substances are considered here in their relation to 
each other, what initially appeared as external media-
tion is truly a self-mediation. This is so to the de-
gree that the presupposed immediacy has been sublated 
and "the conditioning factor of the causal activity is 
still only the passivity of being acted upon, or the 
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passivity of the cause i t s e l f . T h i s achievement is 
causality—as conditioned and conditioning. Recipro-
city is then causality itself and has returned to its 
absolute notion. 
Hegel sees here that a further move has been accom-
plished, in claiming that the Notion itself has been 
attained. The level of substances involved a) free ac-
tualities against each other and b) necessity, taken as 
inner identity. Yet, causality, with its "illusory 
show of substantial otherness" having been sublated, 
accomplishes freedom out of necessity: 
In reciprocity, originative causality displays 
itself as an arising from its negation, from pas-
sivity, and as a passing away into the same, as a 
becoming . . . , r 
The tension of such an originative causality with nega-
tion, however, is in turn, as becoming, seen to be 
illusory. For in typical Hegelian fashion the alleged 
transition into otherness is a reflection into self, 
"the negation, which is ground of the cause, is its 
positive union with itself." 3 7 
With reciprocity, necessity and causality have van-
ished. The "result" is the absolute contradiction of 
a) immediate identity, as relation, of the different 
"sides" and b) the absolute substantial status of the 
different "sides." Necessity, Hegel claims here, is 
Being just because it is a unity of being with itself, 
having itself for ground; but having its own ground it 
cannot fully be Being. And so illusory being, mere re-
lation or mediation, is the true status discovered. 
Causality is thus not self-sustaining but merely pos-
ited as the transition of "originative being" (cause) 
into "illusory being" (positedness) and positedness in-
to originativeness. The and here bespeaks an identity 
of being and illusory being which sublates causality, 
makes substantiality vanish, and reveals necessity. 
Freedom does not arrive on the scene due to the vanish-
ing of necessity; rather it arises as a result of the 
manifestation of the inner identity of necessity—that 
of being and illusory being. Contingency becomes free-
dom once the "sides" of necessity, first appearing as 
independent, free actualities which are discretely 
self-sustaining, are posited as an identity. 
. . . these totalities of reflection-into-self in 
their difference are now also reflected as iden-
tical, or are posited as only one and the same 
reflection. 3 1 
A level of absolute substance is thus presumed 
achieved which self-differentiates as universal because 
originative; as well it self-differentiates as individ-
ual because of its negative aspect as self-identical 
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determinateness, positing itself as the whole as self-
identical negativity: 
This their simple identity is particularity, 
which contains in immediate unity the moment of 
determinateness of the individual and the moment 
of reflection-into-self of the universal. 1' 
Hegel claims here that the three "levels" consid-
ered are one and the same reflection; but as negative 
self-relation, typical of all levels in the doctrine of 
essence, they merge into a "perfectly transparent dif-
ference." He calls this determinate simplicity, simple 
determinateness—the level of identity which is the 
Notion—the "realm of subjectivity or of freedom." 
We have followed Hegel's discussion thus far, but 
will not plunge further into the doctrine of the No-
tion. Yet, our excursus with Hegel to this point has 
provided an adequate basis for seeing to what degree 
his treatment of reciprocity is radically different 
from that of Kant. What we have just seen Hegel term 
"determinate simplicity," the level of identity which 
is the Notion, seems to be the mere fact or relation of 
reciprocity of which he speaks in the Logic of 1830. 
Yet, the mere fact of reciprocity, reciprocity as an 
externality, a mere point of view available to cogni-
tion, is just that only to the degree that it does not 
penetrate the "realm of subjectivity or of freedom." 
The fact of reciprocity then is the level achieved by 
the three totalities—individuality, universality, and 
particularity—as transparent difference. But it re-
mains mere fact if not imbued with the life of the No-
tion, if not comprehended in the province of subjec-
tivity and freedom. Staying within the province of es-
sence, these totalities are merely empty terms. Hence, 
the level of reciprocity, unto itself, must yield to 
the Notion, be absorbed by it, and cede to it any orig-
inal tension or originative power it might first appear 
to have. 
In conclusion, we wish to recall our earlier con-
siderations of Kant's use of reciprocity, now adding to 
our claims those insights which are available as a re-
sult of seeing how Hegelian "reciprocity" has collapsed 
or yielded to the Notion. Since our earlier remarks 
about Kant remain heavily weighted on the side of 
Kant's development of reciprocity more strictly in the 
province of the categorial arrangement and the discus-
sion of community as commercium, we must expand these 
remarks to approximate a comparable level which Hegel's 
treatment has approached—that of subjectivity and 
freedom. Ultimately, we wish to argue that Kant, via 
reciprocity as a strong, very broadly based and far-
reaching doctrine (not only in its limited, categorial 
use), has achieved the articulation of the nature/logos 
relationship as a vital tension, a creative locus 
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which, for Hegel, and because of his use of reciproc-
ity, collapses, thus eventuating in the need for the 
move to the Notion and the absolute standpoint. 
Hegel has introduced reciprocity as "originative-
ness as self-mediating through its negation," and done 
this via a discussion of causality as conditioned and 
conditioning. His treatment of these however has 
claimed to discover their movements to eventuate either 
in vanishing, the collapsing of term upon term or in 
absolute contradiction. For Kant, however, it would 
appear that the tension of such "finds," which for 
Hegel is not maintained but rather impels movement to a 
higher level of stability, is the locus of subjectivity 
and freedom. We have earlier outlined the formal sense 
in which reciprocity/negation is the tension and dynam-
ism of internal relations for Kant. His claims for the 
status of subjectivity, involving both theoretical and 
practical reason, and freedom seem to be undergirded by 
the very creative tension v/hich a doctrine of recipro-
city offers. For the entire activity of knowing and 
experience is the relationship grounded in the fragile 
tension of an "originativeness as self-mediating 
through its negation"—the originary but transparent 
status of human subjectivity as the transcendental 
unity of apperception. Equally important, because al-
ways the same subjectivity, the free activity of the 
subject as both obligated and self-legislating will is 
rooted in such a notion of reciprocity. Here what 
Hegel has discovered as the conditioned-conditioning 
relationship (eventually found inadequate and hence 
generating the need to seek freedom-subjectivity else-
where, in the Notion), Kant claims to be subjectivity 
as the fragile tension of the finite rational being who 
is both intelligible and intelligible-sensible; free 
from natural necessity and free toward the self-
limiting within and creating of the sensible, the con-
tingent. The formal paradigm of reciprocity as the 
conflictual tension, the creative center of nega-
tion/internal relations, is the very life of human sub-
jectivity both as the spontaneous activity of theoret-
ical reason and as the free, autonomous, self-legisla-
tive activity of practical reason. Reciprocity, even 
for Kant, would remain a mere fact, an empty relation, 
were it not for its being, as a formal structure, deri-
vative of its life-contextualizing force. This is to 
claim that the Hegelian reading of a Kantian formal 
reciprocity would be correct only if the structural 
paradigm is cut off from its life-relation to human 
subjectivity and freedom. Not seeing such a connection 
available in the Kantian system, Hegel does need a 
movement onward to the Notion, if any sense of subjec-
tivity-freedom is to be discovered and explicated. 
A further development of those claims would be nec-
essary to fill in the material with which Kant makes 
the connection between the "formal" levels of reciproc-
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ity, theoretical reason, and practical reason. They 
are most readily available, however, in his discussions 
of the keystone concept of freedom, the primacy of 
practical reason, the treatment of is/ought, and espe-
cially the delineation of the tension which is human 
subjectivity as intelligible/intelligible-sensible (not 
merely intelligible/sensible). Such discussions point 
us closer to seeing his claims for human subjectivity 
as an active reciprocity. 
The suggested contrasts appear at least helpful to-
ward a better understanding of the very dense and dark 
exposition of Hegel's doctrine of essence. Reciprocity 
as the culminating category in this division of the 
Logic may serve as the guiding thread back through the 
materials considered before its appearance. The inade-
quacy of reciprocity for Hegel, contrasted with its ap-
parent centrality for Kant, may help us better under-
stand the sense in which Being as indeterminate is our 
beginning in the Logic but found not effective (unwirk-
lich), distant from activity, much less human activity. 
Essence and its ultimate self-exposition of categories, 
as a level of mediation of correlative but "empty" 
terms, is effective but empty because it is still the 
givenness of determinations and the positing of ab-
stractive reflection. For Hegel, the redeeming grace 
of essence, though, is to be found in reciprocity, 
which as the mere sum total of determinations nonethe-
less has achieved the complete state where no external 
residue is outstanding. Such a formal completeness 
awaits the Notion and relation with subjectivity and 
freedom. The quite different Kantian treatment of 
givenness and activity, as the central doctrine of 
reciprocity which is free, rational subjectivity (not 
merely a formal categorial structure), may serve as a 
corrective or at least clarifactory measure so as to 
understand eventually to what degree the movement into 
the Notion, like the status of reciprocity for Hegel, 
will or will not eventuate in total collapse—that of 
logos-nature upon each other—and the vanishing of any 
true, free human subjectivity. 
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